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LESSONS LEARNED
INTRODUCTION
Echoing sentiments from 2005,1 President Bush focused on the
need for tort reform in his 2006 State of the Union address.2 Accord-
ing to the White House, the $250 billion "cost of lawsuits" represents
over 2% of our Gross Domestic Product and makes it difficult for the
United States to compete globally.3 U.S. economic expansion, the Ad-
ministration believes, depends on reducing the "burden" of lawsuits
that "weaken our economy" by raising the costs of goods and services
and stifling job creation.4 To that end, the Administration's 2005 tort
reform agenda included class action reform,5 legislation to halt the
initiation of frivolous lawsuits, 6 and legislation aimed to control asbes-
tos litigation. 7 In 2006, the passage of medical liability reform is a top
priority.8
The President's medical liability reform initiative rests on the as-
sumption that medical malpractice litigation affects health care costs,
as higher medical malpractice premiums and the increased practice
of defensive medicine are a function of the frequency of litigation and
the increased amount of insurer payouts.9 The initiative's supporters
hypothesize that rising premiums are passed on to health care con-
sumers through increases in the cost of care. 10 Physicians who cannot
increase prices to cover their overhead expenses and malpractice pre-
I President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 126, 127 (Feb. 2, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2005/02/20050202-1 1.html.
2 President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PREs.
Doc. 145, 150 (Jan. 31, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/
2006/index.html.
3 U.S. Sec'y of Commerce Don Evans, Remarks in a Panel Discussion on the High
Cost of Lawsuit Abuse at the White House Conference on the Economy, 40 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 2949, 2951 (Dec. 15, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/re-
leases/2004/12/print/20041215-1 1 .html.
4 Id.
5 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 1, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (West 2006)). This Act allows national class action lawsuits
over $5 million to move to federal court. Reformers view the legislation as a victory be-
cause it prevents state judges from "set[ting] national policies." Press Release, Am. Tort
Reform Ass'n, Class Action Passes U.S. House, ATRA Urges Congress to Continue Momen-
tum on Other Reforms (Feb. 17, 2005), http://www.atra.org/show/7872.
6 Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005, H.R. 420, 109th Cong. The Senate has yet to
take action on this bill.
7 Asbestos Compensation Fairness Act of 2005, H.R. 1957, 109th Cong. (2005). The
House has yet to take action on this bill.
8 See Bush, supra note 2.
9 See infra notes 45-55.
10 See Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the
Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1267 (2004).
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miums close their doors, thus compromising patients' access :o care. I I
Furthermore, the Administration postulates that physicians who fear
exposure to liability are likely to engage in the practice of "defensive
medicine," ordering unnecessary tests to protect themselves from mal-
practice claims, thereby contributing further to rising health care
costs.1 2 Citing these concerns, the Administration advocates medical
liability reform to "reduce health care costs and make sure patients
have the doctors and care they need. 1 3
Determined for medical liability reform to gain momentum dur-
ing his second term, President Bush met with congressional leaders
and citizens across the country to discuss his concerns with the medi-
cal liability system and to call upon Congress to pass reform in order
to "fix a broken medical liability system." 14 In response to the Presi-
dent's calls, the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Health-
care (HEALTH) Act of 2005 was introduced in the House and Senate
in February 2005.15 The HEALTH Act, which aims "[t]o improve pa-
tient access to health care services and provide improved medical care
by reducing the excessive burden the liability system places on the
health care delivery system," 16 was passed in the House by a vote of
11 See Andrea D. Stailey, Note, The Health Act's Same Old Story, Different Congress Di-
lemma: Overhauling the Health Act and Unifying Congress as a Remedy for Tort Reform, 40 TULSA
L. REv. 187, 191-92 (2004).
12 See Geoff Boehm, Debunking Medical Malpractice Myths: Unraveling the False Premises
Behind "Tort Reform, "5 YALEJ. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 357, 362-63 (2005).
13 Bush, supra note 1, at 127.
14 President George W. Bush, Remarks Following a Discussion on Medical Liability
Reform in Collinsville, Illinois, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 9, 10 (Jan. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/print/20050105-4.html. President
Bush delivered this speech in Madison County, Illinois, a place described by one 2005
report as the nation's worst 'Judicial hellhole" based on the number of tort related suits
filed and allowed to go forward there. See Press Release, Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, President
Bush to Discuss Need for Civil Justice Reform from Nation's Worst "Judicial Hellhole®"
(Jan. 4, 2005), http://www.atra.org/show/7848.
15 H.R. 534, 109th Cong. (2005). This bill is identical to H.R. 5, 109th Cong. (2005)
and S. 354, 109th Cong. (2005). The House and Senate versions of the HEALTH Act
differ in some important respects. For the purposes of this Note, however, distinguishing
between the bills is unnecessary, as the primary tort provisions in each bill are essentially
the same. Therefore, this Note will treat the Senate and House bills as one. The House
passed the HEALTH Act for the first time in May 2004, by a vote of 229-197. This bill did
not reach the Senate floor during the 108th Congress. See S. 354. Although the reason the
bill never reached the Senate floor is unclear, Senate staff predicted in June 2004 that the
chamber's full calendar, combined with the reduced number of meeting days as a result of
the fall elections, would prevent the Senate from taking up the bill in this legislative ses-
sion. Thus, the Senate's failure to introduce the bill in 2004 did not emanate from a belief
that the bill was likely to fail. See House Passes HEALTH Act as Senate Leadership Judges Likeli-
hood of Passage in 2004, HEALTH POL'Y ADvoc. (Am. Med. Dirs. Ass'n, Columbia, MD), June
2004, at 15, 15, available at http://www.amda.com/federalaffairs/newsletters/june2004/
printissue.pdf.
16 H.R. 534 (statement of purpose).
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230-194 on July 28, 2005.17 The bill has yet to come to the Senate
floor. 18
Politically, medical liability reform is likely to enjoy substantial
support. Among the powerful, well-heeled interest groups, only trial
lawyers are likely to oppose the initiative. Tort reform initiatives are
especially popular among Republicans, because these reforms weaken
the financial power, and therefore the political power, of one of the
largest contributors to the Democratic party-trial lawyers.19 Medical
liability reform also enjoys significant public support. Fueled by me-
dia hype highlighting seemingly exorbitant jury awards and physician
office closings,20 many Americans believe that the health care crisis
emanates from the legal system, and they are eager for the govern-
ment to address the issue. 21
Yet, we do not have compelling evidence that a medical liability
crisis exists. Those who oppose medical liability reform attribute ris-
ing health costs and the decreasing availability of care to systemic
problems within the health care system, the cyclical nature of the in-
surance industry, and economic factors. 22 As such, these opponents
suggest that federal medical liability reform such as the HEALTH Act
is unlikely to be an effective solution.2 3
This Note examines the economic and social forces serving as the
impetus for the HEALTH Act, and the likelihood that the Act will
achieve its objectives. The Note begins by considering whether we
need federal medical liability reform. Part I addresses the health care
17 151 CONG. REc. H6974, 7012 (daily ed. July 28, 2005).
18 GovTrack: S. 354: HEALTH Act of 2005, available at http://www.govtrack.us/con-
gress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-354 (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
19 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Lobbyists on Both Sides Duel in the Medical Malpractice Debate,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003, at A21 (noting that the American Medical Association, which
opposes medical liability reform, contributes mostly to Republicans, and that the Associa-
tion of Trial Lawyers of America, which supports such reform, contributes mostly to
Democrats).
20 See Finley, supra note 10 ("[T]he media has fueled the controversy by publishing
highly selective-and thus misleading-accounts of some large tort verdicts that seemed to
lend truth to the criticisms."); infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (describing highly
publicized doctor walkouts and office closings); see also infra notes 63-69 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the media's influence on public perceptions of the tort system).
21 HEALTH COAL. ON LIAB. & ACCESS, AMERICANS SAY HEALTH CARE ACCESS
THREATENED BY LIABILITY CRISIS: MOST BELIEVE QUALITY CARE AT-RISK FROM LITIGATION 1
(2004), available at http://www.hcla.org/factsheets/2004-HCLA-Poll-(Fact%2OSheet).pdf
(noting that 82% of Americans believe that litigation costs are driving physicians out of
practice, 72% believe that increasing costs of medical liability lawsuits have led to greater
health care expenses for all Americans, and 72% want Congress to enact legislation placing
caps on noneconomic damages).
22 See infta Part II.B.
23 See MARTIN D. WEISS ET AL., WEISS RATINGS, INC., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAPS: THE
IMPACT OF NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGE CAPS ON PHYSICIAN PREMIUMS, CLAIMS PAYOUT LEVELS,
AND AVAILABILITY OF COVERAGE 3-4 (2003), available at http://weissratings.com/
MedicalMalpractice.pdf.
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crisis motivating the medical liability reform movement. After briefly
describing some of the primary problems in our medical system, such
as increasing costs and decreasing access to care, this Part considers
the rationale of tort reformers who attribute these problems to a
faulty medical liability system. Part II challenges this rationale by ex-
posing several myths about the relationship between the tort system
and the health care system. It then argues that our health care crisis
results from a confluence of systemic problems unrelated to medical
liability and malpractice lawsuits. In sum, there is no medical liability
crisis.
This Note then looks to the efficacy of current medical liability
reform proposals at the state and federal level. That is, if a medical
liability crisis exists, will current attempts to remedy the problem be
effective? Part III discusses medical liability reform initiatives at the
state and federal level. In Part IV, this Note evaluates the effects of
current tort reform initiatives by surveying findings of several major
studies of these initiatives. This discussion reveals the inefficacy of
most tort reform legislation in lowering premium rates or decreasing
the number of malpractice claims filed. At the same time, the states'
caps on noneconomic damages disproportionately harm vulnerable
populations such as women, children, and the elderly. This Part con-
cludes by highlighting the work of a few scholars who postulate that
formal changes in state tort laws may have important nonformal con-
sequences by altering public perception and thus the market environ-
ment in which the tort system operates.
In Part V, this Note evaluates the reforms to federal law proposed
in the HEALTH Act. These findings lend support to the Note's con-
clusion that the HEALTH Act is unlikely to achieve its stated objec-
tives. Moreover, in light of the potential effects of public perception
on the tort system, national tort reform could undermine reformers'
efforts by changing popular conceptions of the civil justice system.
Observing that little empirical evidence supports the efficacy of the
reforms articulated in the HEALTH Act, and recognizing the Act's
potential to disproportionately harm vulnerable groups, this Note
concludes in Part VI that the Congress should reject the Act. Instead,
state governments should continue to implement and monitor re-
forms and both federal and state governments should engage in sys-
tematic efforts to identify factors that adversely affect our health care
system. Finally, this Note suggests specific changes at the state level
that may reduce medical malpractice and halt the premium rate in-
crease while leaving open the courthouse door to victims of appalling
medical harm.
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I
THE CALL FOR FEDERAL MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM: A
LITIGATION CRISIS
A. A Health Care System in Crisis
The crisis in our health care system includes the skyrocketing
costs of medical care and prescription drugs, a rising number of unin-
sured persons, sharply escalating malpractice premiums, high rates of
medical error, and a widespread perception that access to proper care
is becoming increasingly elusive. The United States spent $1.6 trillion
on health care in 2002,24 more per capita than any other nation in the
world,25 but it consistently has poorer health outcomes than other de-
veloped countries. 26 For example, among industrialized countries,
the United States ranks 26th in infant mortality rates,27 and, at any
given moment, over 40 million Americans are without health insur-
ance. 28 Health care costs are consuming an increasingly larger por-
tion of household budgets, rising from $1,300 per capita in inflation-
adjusted dollars in 1970 to $5,450 in 2002,29 or 14.9% of our Gross
Domestic Product.30 Moreover, pharmaceutical costs are surging,
with growth in spending increasing at more than 14% annually be-.
tween 1997 and 2002.31
Of even greater concern is the Institute of Medicine's (IOM)
warning in 2000 that our medical system is failing to offer meaningful
health care solutions to a significant number of individuals.3 2 Specifi-
cally, the IOM estimates that preventable medical error kills between
44,000 and 98,000 individuals annually, such that "deaths due to medi-
cal errors exceed the number attributable to the 8th leading cause of
24 Health Care Spending and the Uninsured: Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, La-
bor, and Pensions, 108th Cong. 8 (2004) [hereinafter The Uninsured] (statement of Douglas
Holtz-Eakin, Director, Cong. Budget Office), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
49xx/doc4989/01-28-HealthTestimony.pdf.
25 BUREAU OF LABOR EDUC., UNIV. OF ME., THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYsTEM: BEST IN THE
WORLD, OR JUST THE MosT EXPENSIVE?, at 2-3 (2002) [hereinafter BUREAU OF LABOR
EDUC.]; Uwe Reinhardt, How Healthy Is Our Health Care?, PRINCETON ALUMNI WKLY., Apr. 10,
2002, http://www.princeton.edu/-paw/web-exclusives/plus/plus_O41002Reinhardt.html
("The United States has long been the most expensive health system in the world, and it
remains so today. .. ").
26 See BUREAU OF LABOR EDUC., supra note 25, at 4-7.
27 Id. at 5.
28 See The Uninsured, supra note 24, at I (statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director,
Congressional Budget Office) ("From 2000 to 2002, the number of nonelderly people who
were uninsured increased from 39.4 million to 43.3 million ...
29 Id. at 8.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 See generally INST. OF MED., To ERR is HuMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 1999) (reporting on the quality of American health care).
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death."3 3 The IOM estimates that these errors cost the nation be-
tween $17 billion and $29 billion annually.3 4 The estimated number
of preventable deaths has risen to approximately 195,000, excluding
errors in obstetrics. 35
Since at least the early 1990s, policymakers have been concerned
with rising health care costs and the resulting increase in the number
of uninsured patients. 36 Despite these warning signs, the mounting
crisis in health care did not generate widespread public support for
government-sponsored change.37 The government sought to remedy
a system in trouble by attempting national initiatives such as the failed
Clinton health care plan, 38 which met with deep public skepticism
about the role of government in addressing health care problems. 39
Public awareness of the health care crisis emerged in 2001, when
rising medical malpractice premiums began to burden Americans
with health insurance through corresponding increases in health in-
surance costs, reduced coverage, and the decreasing availability of
care.40 Anecdotal reports of doctors permanently closing their prac-
tices or moving to different states because of rising malpractice premi-
ums reinforced the perception of a threat to patients' access to health
care.
41
Nationally publicized work stoppages in 2003 and walkouts by
doctors in hospitals and private practices lent further credence to this
perception. For example, in January 2003, a group of West Virginia
surgeons whose contracts had expired on December 31, 2002, pro-
tested against "soaring medical malpractice costs" by walking out of
hospitals. 42 Similarly, in 2003, physicians in southern Florida initiated
33 See id. at 1.
34 See id.
35 See Boehm, supra note 12, at 357.
36 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS: CAUSES, IMPLI-
CATIONS, AND STRATEGIES 28-29, 33-57 (1991) [hereinafter RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS]
(discussing the number of uninsured patients and evaluating policies to control health
care spending); see also Testimony Before the S. Subcomm. on Legis. Branch Comm. on Appropria-
tions, 104th Cong. 4 (1992) (statement of Robert D. Reischauer, Director, Cong. Budget
Office) (noting that the Congressional Budget Office "has published six major health care
reports in ten months, helping to set the stage for the debate on the future of health care
in this country").
37 See HAYNES JOHNSON & DAViD S. BRODER, THE SYSTEM 534 (1997).
38 See Derek Bok, The Great Health Care Debate of 1993-1994, PUBLIC TALK, Fall 1998,
http://www.upenn.edu/pnc/ptbok.html.
39 SeeJoHNSON & BRODER, supra note 37 ("By the nineties, attitudes about government
had turned deeply negative. Americans wanted to limit, not expand, government's role in
their lives, as the fate of the health care battle demonstrated so clearly.").
40 See Finley, supra note 10, at 1267.
41 See Stailey, supra note 11, at 188, 191.
42 Lauren Elizabeth Rallo, Comment, The Medical Malpractice Crisis-Who Will Deliver
the Babies of Today, the Leaders of Tomorrow?, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 509, 512
(2004).
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a slowdown in the delivery of medical services by gradually refusing to
see patients except in emergency cases.43 Around the same time,
thousands of Pennsylvania physicians simultaneously closed their of-
fices for one week. 44 Such upheavals caused Americans to perceive a
crisis in their health care system. Many Americans, led astray by a
public ethos that linked work stoppages to lawsuits, branded excessive
litigation the culprit.
B. A Solution to the Health Care Crisis: Medical Liability
Reform
Tort reformers insist that rising costs and difficulties in obtaining
treatment in our health care system stem from high jury awards in
medical malpractice cases. 45 In addition to the direct costs associated
with a given judgment, reformers argue, high jury awards raise mal-
practice premiums by encouraging doctors to practice "defensive
medicine ' 46 and patients to file "frivolous" lawsuits.4 7 They further
assert that significant financial resources, which otherwise might be
put to constructive use, must be set aside to defend against such
claims. 48 Finally, tort reformers assert that high malpractice premi-
ums disastrously reduce the availability of care in certain areas and
within certain specialties because premium costs are too high for phy-
sicians to remain in practice.49 According to this argument, affected
doctors who do not choose to leave medicine altogether will relocate
to states with lower malpractice premiums.50
43 Stailey, supra note 11, at 187.
44 See id. at 188.
45 See, e.g., Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, Medical Liability Reform, http://www.atra.org/
show/7338 (last visited Apr. 4, 2006) ("[The] inequities and inefficiencies of the medical
liability system negatively affect the cost and quality of health care as well as access to
adequate health care.").
46 See, e.g., id. ("[T]he practice of 'defensive medicine' as a means of reducing or
avoiding tort liability is a major contributor to health care cost.").
47 See Stolberg, supra note 19 ("President Bush has been attacking trial lawyers ... for
'frivolous lawsuits' . . . .").
48 See Finley, supra note 10, at 1267.
49 See Stailey, supra note 11, at 191. Premiums for obstetrics and gynecology are the
highest of all specialties and have been rising rapidly. See id. One study reported that
physicians paid "11.5% more in 2000 than they did in 1999; 9.2% more in 2001 than they
did in 2000; and 19.3% more in 2002 than they did in 2001." Id. Because of such in-
creases, one reporter asserted that "in many states it is getting difficult to find doctors who
will deliver babies." Id.
50 See id. at 191 ("Reports abound of physicians who are limiting their practices to...
geographical areas with lower malpractice premiums .. "). But see id. at 192 (citing stud-
ies by opponents of tort reform that "have found no evidence to support claims that doc-
tors are leaving certain areas because of high insurance rates; instead, [the studies]
indicate that doctors are flooding into many of these states" (quotations omitted)).
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Tort reform advocates offer much anecdotal evidence to support
their charge that physicians' preoccupation with liability leads them to
neglect health care. The following anecdote is a typical example:
Leanne Dyess' . . . husband, Tony Dyess, crashed his car... and
suffered severe head injuries. But the [closest] hospital did not
have a specialist who could put a shunt into Tony Dyess' head to
reduce the swelling of his brain. He did not get adequate care until
he was airlifted to Jackson's University of Mississippi Medical
Center-six hours later.
"I learned there were no specialists on staff that night... be-
cause rising medical liability costs had forced physicians in that
community to abandon their practices," Leanne Dyess said.
Her husband is now permanently brain damaged and under
the care of his parents .... 51
In addition to such anecdotal evidence, tort reform supporters cite
limited empirical evidence in support of their claims of crisis. For
example, in eleven states, medical malpractice filings increased 18%
from 1993 to 2002.52 Additionally, physician premiums rose 15% be-
tween 2000 and 2002.53 The American Medical Association (AMA)
reports that "more than 26% of health care institutions have reacted
to the liability crisis by cutting back on services, or even eliminating
some units."54 In some cases, this has resulted in doctors refusing to
perform high-risk surgeries. 55 Additionally, insurance companies may
decline to cover some "high-risk" surgeries in states that have been hit
hard by the "health care crisis. ' ' 56 Other major insurers, such as St.
Paul Travelers, have stopped providing medical liability insurance al-
together, leaving thousands of customers in search of alternative
insurers. 57
51 Ana Radelat, Mississippian Joins Battle on Capitol Hill over Medical Malpractice, GAN-
NETT NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 12, 2003, cited in Health Coal. on Liab. & Access, The Facts, http:/
/www.hcla.org/crisis.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
52 NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: A NA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, 2003, at 28 (Richard Y. Schauff-
ler et al., eds., 2003) [hereinafter NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 2003], available at http://
www.ncsconline.org/D-research/csp/2003_.Files/2003_MainPage.html.
53 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., LIMITING TORT LIABI UY FOR MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE 1 (2004) [hereinafter LIMITING TORT LrAIurIY], http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/
doc4968/01-08-MedicalMalpractice.pdf.
54 Assessing the Need to Enact Medical Liability Reform, Hearing on H.1 5 Before the Sub-
comm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 122 (2003), quoted in
Stailey, supra note 11, at 191-92.
55 See Stailey, supra note 11, at 191.
56 See Health Coal. on Liab. & Access, supra note 51 ("Nearly 56% of Blue Cross/Blue
Shield plans in the 12 'crisis' states identified by the American Medical Association are
refusing some high-risk procedures.").
57 See id. (noting that before withdrawing this coverage, St. Paul insured 42,000 doc-
tors, 750 hospitals, 5,800 health care facilities, and 72,000 health care providers).
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FIGURE 1
TRENDS IN PREMIUMS FOR PHYSICIANS' MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE, BY TYPE OF PHYSICIAN, 1993-2002
Source: Figure 1 in Congressional Budget Office, Limiting 
Tort Liability, cited in text note
53, at 2 (based on data from the Office of the Actuary at the 
Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services and from annual premium surveys 
conducted by Medical Liability Moni-
tor). © Congressional Budget Office. Reproduced with permission.
Although physician practice closings and restrictions 
on insur-
ance coverage harm all Americans, reformers point 
to statistics that
indicate that women suffer disproportionate injury because the 
most
severely affected specialties, obstetrics and gynecology, 
cater specifi-
cally to women.58 Doctors in these specialties saw 
a 22% increase in
their premiums between 2000 and 2002.
59 Concerns about physicians
closing their doors, insurers pulling out of states, 
escalating premi-
ums, and harm to women in need of obstetricians and 
gynecologists,
have fueled efforts by tort reform proponents to 
mitigate the effects of
the legal system on patients' access to care.
58 See LIMITING TORT LIABILIrY, supra note 
53, at I n.1 (citing data from the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services and from 
annual surveys conducted by Medical Liability
Monitor newsletter); see also supra note 49 (noting rising 
premiums in obstetrics and
gynecology).
59 LIMITING TORT LIABILITY, supra note 53, at 1.
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II
CRITIQUING THE CALL FOR MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM: A
MEDICAL SYSTEM IN CRISIS
A. Exposing Myths About the Causal Relationship Between Tort
Litigation and the Health Care Crisis
Despite the public clamor, those opposed to tort reform believe
that no medical liability crisis exists.60 They deny that the tort system
has created or could solve the health care crisis. Instead, they assert
that the legal system provides groups of medical professionals, such as
the AMA, with a scapegoat for the health system's systemic troubles.6 1
Moreover, this convenient explanation also allows politicians and tort
reform lobbyists to use public persuasion campaigns to change socie-
tal beliefs about fairness in our justice system. As some commentators
put it:
[Tort] reformers . . . want to affect the way in which the media,
intellectuals, key elites, and ultimately the public at large think
about the civil justice system .... More than just the formal legal
changes it seeks, tort reform has always been about altering the cul-
tural environment surrounding civil litigation .... The best evi-
dence of this is found in the various public relations campaigns
used by the reform interests since at least the 1970s .... 62
Despite evidence that judges believe that juries are generally effective
in meting out justice and assigning equitable awards to deserving
plaintiffs, 63 headline news stories fuel public skepticism about ourjus-
tice system and the tort system in particular. 64 The highly publicized
case of the plaintiff who received $2.9 million from McDonald's for
spilling hot coffee on herself exemplifies the media's portrayal of a
tort system out of control. 65 Media hype in the area of medical mal-
60 Many opponents of tort reform do acknowledge, however, that increasing costs and
decreasing access to care may have created a health care crisis. See, e.g., Finley, supra note
10, at 1268-77 (presenting empirical evidence that increased premiums result not from
high tort damages but from economic and systemic forces).
61 See id. at 1267.
62 Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "The Impact That It Has Had Is Between People's
Ears:" Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs' Lauyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 453 (2000)
[hereinafter Daniels & Martin, Ears].
63 See Boehm, supra note 12, at 367-68 (discussing the results of a 2000 judicial survey
finding that only 1% of judges give the jury system "low marks," while 90% of judges be-
lieve thatjurors "show considerable understanding of legal issues involved in the cases they
hear" (quotations omitted)).
64 See Michael McCann et al., JavaJive: Genealogy of a Juridical Icon, 56 U. MiAMi L. REv.
113, 116 (2001) ("Our own aggregate content analysis... shows how news coverage of tort
litigation by reports relying on . .. routine institutional conventions produces a consistent
portrait of legal action that parallels in form and substance the selective, simplistic anecdo-
tal portrayals of civil legal practice disseminated by tort reformers.").
65 See generally id. (arguing that the publicity surrounding that case profoundly influ-
enced American attitudes toward the tort system).
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practice includes unsupported anecdotes of doctors' office closings, 66
skyrocketing jury awards,67 and "frivolous lawsuits." 68 These media
presentations of the tort system as "out of control" erode public un-
derstanding of the tort system as a tool for ordinary citizens to redress
social wrongs and "hold accountable those with power-including
corporations, large institutions, professionals, and even
government. " 69
After pointing out that the campaign for tort reform is, in part,
an ideological war, those opposed to medical liability reform deny the
role of the tort system in causing the problems in the health care sys-
tem by rebutting several myths espoused by tort reformers. A discus-
sion of these myths and their rebuttal follows.
1. The Medical Liability-National Competitiveness Myth
Contrary to public perception, medical malpractice spending ac-
counts for less than 2% of all health care spending. 70 Thus, even a
50% reduction in medical malpractice costs would have a negligible
effect on the $1.6 trillion dollars Americans spend annually on health
care. 71 This evidence reveals that President Bush's push for medical
liability reform as a means of increasing national competitiveness by
decreasing allegedly wasteful health care expenditures 72 is drastically
overstated, if not spurious. Just as importantly, a reduction in mal-
practice liability could create a disincentive to invest in error reduc-
tion, thus increasing the already high rate of medical error.73
Malpractice liability is one of the few means by which patients can
hold their physicians to high standards of care and encourage health
organizations to institute mechanisms to reduce medical error. Thus,
not only is medical liability reform likely to have a negligible effect on
health care spending, it may also lead to a further decline in the qual-
ity of health outcomes.
66 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
67 See Finley, supra note 10.
68 See Boehm, supra note 12, at 358-60. Tort reformers are fond of asserting that each
U.S. consumer pays a "tort tax" of $809 per year. See Dan Zegert, Tort Reform Advocates Play
Fast and Loose with the Facts, 30 MONT. LAw., Feb. 2005, at 30, 30. This figure was arrived at
simply by dividing $233 billion, the supposed cost of the tort system, by the population of
the United States. See id. at 33. Yet opponents of reform dispute the $233 billion figure,
noting that it includes the total costs of the insurance industry, including not only legal
fees but also executive salaries, advertising, and other miscellaneous costs. See id. Thus,
the actual "tort tax" may be far less than $809. See id.
69 See Boehm, supra note 12, at 366.
70 LIMITING TORT LIABILITY, supra note 53, at 1.
71 The Uninsured, supra note 24, at 8 (statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director,
Congressional Budget Office).
72 See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
73 See LIMITING TORT LIABILITY, supra note 53, at 5.
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FIGURE 2
TORT AND CONTRACT FILINGS IN GENERAL JURISDICTION TRIAL
COURTS IN 17 STATES, 1993-2002
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Contract Filings +21%
300,000 ._....._-- . .... -5%
-5%
Tort Filings
200,000
100,000
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Source: Figure 1 in National Center for State Courts, Examining the Work of State Courts:
A National Perspective from the Court Statistics Project, 2003, cited in text note 52, at 23.
© National Center for State Courts. Reproduced with permission.
2. The Malpractice Premium-Litigation Myth
Empirical evidence demonstrates that the rise in malpractice pre-
miums does not result from an increase in litigation. First, tort filings
have not increased in recent years.7 4 Indeed, between 1993 and 2002,
tort filings decreased 5%, compared with a 21% increase in contract
filings. 75 Moreover, between 1994 and 2003, tort filings declined 10%
overall in fifteen states.76 Additionally, medical malpractice claims
constitute only a small percentage of state tort claims. From 2001 to
2003-"crisis" years according to reform advocates-medical malprac-
tice filings constituted no more than 5% of all tort claims, 77 a rate
comparable to that in the early 1990s. 78 Assessments of medical mal-
74 NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 2003, supra note 52, at 23 fig.
75 See id.
76 NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: A NA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, 2004, at 26 fig. (Richard Y.
Schauffler et al. eds., 2004), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/d_research/csp/
2004_Files/EW2004_MainPage.html. Additionally, between 1993 and 2002, tort filings
declined 4% overall in the thirty-five states able to provide data. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, 2003, supra note 52, at 23. These states represent 77% of the U.S. population. Id.
77 See Finley, supra note 10, at 1268. Medical malpractice claims constitute a larger
percentage of tort cases actually litigated, however. See THOMAS H. COHEN & STEVEN K.
SMITH, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 2001: CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN
LARGE COUNTIES, 2001, at 2 tbl.1 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/ctcvlc01.pdf (finding that medical malpractice trials constituted 9.7% of state trials in
the largest 75 counties).
78 See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 2003, supra note 52, at 26 (comparing medical
malpractice claims in the 75 largest counties in 1992 with automobile claims, which ac-
count for 60% of all tort claims, and "slip and fall" claims, which account for 17%).
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practice filings overjust a few years can be misleading because longitu-
dinal data suggest that filing trends fluctuate over four and five year
spans. For example, in eleven states, malpractice claims remained sta-
ble for three years between 1996 and 1998, declined in 1999 and 2000,
and increased by 10% for two years thereafter. 79 Taken altogether, it
appears that medical malpractice filings in those states are growing by
approximately 1% annually.80 Rather than view this slight increase in
malpractice filings as reflecting Americans' overly litigious nature, the
increase may largely result from the rising per capita consumption of
medical services. 81
Second, even if medical malpractice claims are increasing, medi-
cal malpractice trials and insurer payouts are not. Between 1992 and
2001, there was a 14.2% decrease in medical malpractice trials.8 2 Ad-
ditionally, very few of the cases that are filed result in a verdict, let
alone a verdict in the plaintiffs favor.83 Furthermore, despite the in-
crease in medical malpractice filings, the number of large claims paid
out by insurers has remained relatively stable.8 4
Third, little evidence supports reformers' assertions that there
are too many frivolous lawsuits. While some false claims undoubtedly
are filed, research suggests that, in light of the high rate of preventa-
ble medical error in the United States, 85 the number of claims filed
may be quite low, with only one out of every eight incidents of medical
error resulting in a medical malpractice claim.86
79 Id. at 28.
80 See id. That figure includes five additional states that were included for only the last
five years of the period studied. Id.
81 See Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in
Texas, 1988-2002, 2J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207, 229-30 (2005) (noting that one should
expect medical practice claims to increase along with the increasing consumption of medi-
cal care services).
82 COHEN & SMITH, supra note 77, at 9 tbl.10.
83 See Finley, supra note 10, at 1268-69 (reporting that less than 5% of all medical
malpractice cases that are filed make it to trial); MitchellJ. Nathanson, It's the Economy (and
Combined Ratio), Stupid: Examining the Medical Malpractice Litigation Crisis Myth and the Factors
Critical to Reform, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 1077, 1107 (2004) (reporting that between 1985 and
1999, only 6.7% of all medical malpractice cases that were filed resulted in a verdict, and
only 1.3% favored the plaintiff). The low number of verdicts favoring plaintiffs may be
skewed by a "selection effect" on the cases that go to trial. See infra note 90.
84 See Black et al., supra note 81, at 252 ("For Texas, the frequency of large paid medi-
cal malpractice claims, and the per-claim cost of these claims, were relatively stable from
1988 to 2002 ....").
85 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
86 Ashley Stewart, Casenote, Texas' House Bill Four's Noneconomic Damage Caps Impose the
Burden of Supporting the Medical Industry Solely upon Those Most Severely Injured and Therefore
Most in Need of Compensation, 57 SMU L. REV. 497, 503 (2004).
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3. The Malpractice Premium-Jury Award Myth
Empirical evidence also suggests that one cannot attribute the
rise in malpractice premiums to higher jury awards. Data from Texas
suggest that the value of jury awards to successful plaintiffs has re-
mained stable over the past fifteen years.87 Moreover, less than 5% of
all medical malpractice claims actually make it to trial.88 When they
do,juries tend to favor defendants. 89 For example, plaintiffs won only
27% of cases in 2001.90 Furthermore, very few successful plaintiffs re-
ceive awards for noneconomic damages in excess of the proposed cap
of $250,000. 91
Additionally, despite all of the publicity, large jury awards consti-
tute only 4% of insurers' payouts because many large awards are never
paid. 92 Instead, many plaintiffs enter "high-low" agreements in ad-
vance of the jury verdict.93 These agreements establish an upper and
lower limit for damages, such as $1 million and $3 million.94 If the
verdict favors the plaintiff, then, regardless of the actual jury award,
the defendant will pay no more than $3 million; if the verdict favors
87 See Black et al., supra note 81 (analyzing Texas closed claims data from 1988 to
2002). But see COHEN & SMITH, supra note 77, at 9 tbl.II (finding that, although median
awards in all state civil trials decreased 43.1%, median jury awards in medical malpractice
cases increased 70.4% between 1992 and 2001); Black et al., supra note 81, at 212 (citing a
study by Neil Vidmar et al. that found that median payouts in Florida substantially in-
creased between 1990 and 2003).
88 See Finley, supra note 10, at 1268-69.
89 See id. at 1269.
90 COHEN & SMITH, supra note 77, at 4 tbl.5. This statistic includes verdicts from
bench and jury trials (including those with defendants in default), directed verdicts, and
judgments notwithstanding the verdict. See id. Contrary to popular perception, research
shows that plaintiffs in tort cases are more likely to be successful before ajudge than ajury.
See id. at 3 tbl.2. This finding, along with the statistics cited above revealing plaintiffs'
success in jury trials, must be considered in conjunction with the "selection effect" recog-
nized among academics as affecting the number and type of cases tried:
Cases only go to trial when the parties substantially disagree on the pre-
dicted outcome of trial .... These unsettled close cases fall more or less
equally on either side of the legal standard, regardless of both that stan-
dards' position and the underlying distribution of disputes. Thus, even if
the legal standard highly favors plaintiffs, one might not observe a plaintiff
trial win rate well above 50%.
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial byJuty orJudge: Transcending Empiricism, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1129 (1992). Because of this phenomenon, statistics indicating the
frequency of plaintiff wins may be misleading.
91 See Stewart, supra note 86, at 502.
92 Joseph T. Hallinan, Suit Wrinkle: In Malpractice Trials, Juries Rarely Have the Last Word,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2004, at Al; see also Melissa Patterson, Note, The Medical Malpractice
Crisis: The Product of Insurance Companies and a Threat to Women's Health, 8 QUINNIPIAC
HEALTH L.J. 109, 128-29 (2004) (noting that insurers' payouts have risen at the same pace
as medical inflation for 30 years).
93 See Hallinan, supra note 92; see also Steven R. Gabel, High/Low Settlement Agreements:
Method for Dispute Resolutions, 73 MICH. B.J. 74, 74 (1994) (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of high-low agreements).
94 See Hallinan, supra note 92.
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the defendant, however, then the plaintiff is guaranteed to receive $1
million. Parties enter such agreements to hedge their bets against los-
ing at trial and to avoid costly appeals.9 5 These agreements are confi-
dential; thus, their frequency and effect on reducing insurer payouts
are not fully known. 96 Professor Neil Vidmar conservatively estimates
that high-low agreements reduce at least 44% ofjury awards.9 7 Profes-
sor Vidmar estimates that, on average, plaintiffs receive 62% of their
jury awards; moreover, this figure can drop below 10% of the jury
award when the awards are unusually large.98 These estimates further
support data showing thatjury payouts constitute only a small percent-
age of insurer costs and thus cannot be primarily responsible for ris-
ing malpractice premiums. Even if, as reformers suggest, caps alter
the bargaining-power dynamics in settlement discussions, the small
number of jury awards in excess of statutory caps99 suggests that these
caps will have a negligible effect on settlement discussions in most
cases.
Those opposed to tort reform explain today's higher jury awards
as corresponding to the rate of medical inflation, which reflects the
increasing cost of medical care. 100 According to the National Practi-
tioner Data Bank, between 1997 and 2001, the median physician pay-
out to malpractice claimants rose less than the rate of medical
inflation. 10 1 Specifically, a comparison of median jury awards in 1992
and 2001 reveals a 70% increase in jury verdicts, yet the 51.7% in-
crease in medical costs and the general inflation of 26.2% could ex-
plain most of this increase. 10 2 The increasing severity of the claims
that reach the jury further explains the increasing jury verdicts. 10 3
4. The Malpractice Premium-Access to Care Myth
Those opposed to tort reform point to empirical evidence that
suggests that the rise in malpractice premiums has not generally led to
95 See id.
96 See id. "In 2000, Pennsylvania reported three of the largest medical-malpractice
verdicts in its history, all of them rendered in Philadelphia: one for $100 million, another
for $55 million and a third for $49.6 million." Id. Ultimately, however, "[t]he $55 million
case settled for $7.5 million, according to the lawyer for the plaintiff. The $49.6 million
case settled for $8.4 million, according to court documents. And the $100 million case
settled for an undisclosed sum . . . significantly less than $100 million." Id.
97 Neil Vidmar et al., Juy Awards for Medical Malpractice and Post-Verdict Adjustments of
Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 265, 298 (1998).
98 See id. at 298.
99 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
100 See Finley, supra note 10, at 1269.
101 Id. at 1270.
102 Id. at 1269.
103 Id. ("[I]n 2001, 90% of medical malpractice trials involved plaintiffs who suffered
the most severe injuries of death or permanent disability, and damage awards are the high-
est in these types of cases.").
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a decrease in the availability of care.' 0 4 In fact, the General Account-
ing Office reported that "there has not been any documentable ad-
verse effect on access to health care, except in some scattered, often
rural areas, where factors other than malpractice premiums contrib-
ute to the access issues.' 0 5 Furthermore, some states singled out by
the AMA as suffering from a decrease in the availability of care exper-
ienced an increase in the number of physicians per capita. 10 6
5. The Litigation-Defensive Medicine Myth
Finally, those in favor of tort reform advocate reform to reduce
the practice of "defensive medicine."'01 7 Physicians order unnecessary
tests, so the argument goes, for fear of exposing themselves to liabil-
ity. t08 Yet, an Office of Technology Assessment study showing that
"less than eight percent of all diagnostic procedures result primarily
from liability concerns" proves these concerns to be exaggerated
greatly at best.10 9 Similarly, the Congressional Budget Office found
that "savings from reducing defensive medicine would be very
small." 110
B. An Alternative Explanation for the Origins of Our Health
Care Crisis: Systemic Problems, Insurance Cycles, and
the Economy
1. Systemic Problems, Not Litigation, Are at the Root of Our Health
Care Crisis
Opponents of medical liability reform believe that the U.S. health
care crisis of increasing costs and decreasing availability reflects a
number of underlying concerns that do not stem from medical mal-
practice litigation. Instead, systemic problems call for narrowly tai-
lored solutions. These problems include the uninsured, the
underinsured, rapidly rising prescription drug costs, the tying of
health insurance to employment, market failures in the health care
system, the increasing consumption of health services, the prolifera-
tion of new and expensive medical technologies, and the absence of
104 See id. at 1271. But see WEiss ET AL., supra note 23, at 3 ("Soaring premiums on
medical malpractice insurance ... are ... threatening the availability of care.").
105 See Finley, supra note 10, at 1271.
106 Id.
107 See LIMITING TORT LIABILITY, supra note 53, at 6; Randall R. Bovbjerg & Laurence R.
Tancredi, Liability Reform Should Make Patients Safer: "Avoidable Classes of Events" Are a Key
Improvement, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 478, 481 (2005) (reporting that doctors believe the
current system causes the practice of defensive medicine).
108 See A.C. Hoffman, Governmental Studies on Medical Malpractice: The Implications of Ris-
ing Premiums for Healthcare and the Allocation of Health Resources, 24 MED. & L. 297, 304
(2005).
109 Boehm, supra note 12, at 363.
110 See LIMITING TORT LIABILITY, supra note 53, at 6.
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federal regulation in the insurance market. Capping noneconomic
and punitive damage awards in the hope of reducing medical mal-
practice premiums and discouraging the practice of defensive
medicine will not solve these problems. Even if medical liability re-
form is successful in reducing malpractice premiums in the short
term, these gains will remain temporary as the system continues to
absorb the increasing costs of other aspects of care. Problems en-
demic to the health care system require systemic solutions; tort reform
cannot provide anything more than a temporary one.
2. An Explanation for Escalating Premiums: Insurance Cycles and
the Economy
Because of conflicting data and the politicization of tort reform,
separating fact from fiction is difficult in this debate. Commentators
disagree over the facts and even the existence of a crisis, making it
difficult to evaluate or craft reform agendas. Yet discerning agreed-
upon facts is critical to moving forward. The only significant undis-
puted fact in the malpractice reform debate seems to be that premi-
ums have been rising sharply since 2001.111 While disagreement
persists over the origins of this premium increase, the explanations
for rising premium costs offered by advocates of tort reform remain
unsubstantiated. In fact, some evidence suggests that escalating pre-
miums are mostly attributable to economic and investment cycles.' 1 2
The General Accounting Office and Weiss Ratings 13 indepen-
dently researched the effects of tort reform at the state level and at-
tempted to determine the cause of escalating medical malpractice
insurance premiums.1 14 Both groups found that damage caps do not
lead to lower insurance premiums for doctors. 115 Similarly, a report
by Americans for Insurance Reform found that, while jury awards and
physicians' payouts are correlated strongly with medical inflation,
medical malpractice premiums are not correlated with these payouts
"in any direct way." 116 Instead, the cost of malpractice insurance is
correlated strongly with the highs and lows of insurance companies'
profit margins and investment health.1 17 Thus, rather than suggesting
111 See, e.g., id. at 1; Finley, supra note 10, at 1267.
112 See supra Part II.B.2.
113 Weiss Ratings is an independent agency that provides ratings of insurance and fi-
nancial institutions. See About Weiss Ratings, http://weissratings.com/about-weiss.asp
(last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
114 See Finley, supra note 10, at 1271-74.
115 Id. at 1271-72.
116 AMS. FOR INS. REFORM, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: STABLE LOSSES/UNSTABLE
RATES 4 (2002), http://insurance-reform.org/StableLosses.pdf (quoted in Finley, supra
note 10, at 1274).
117 WEISS ET AL., supra note 23, at 3-4; Finley, supra note 10, at 1274 (citing AMS. FOR
INS. REFORM, supra note 116).
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that high jury awards increase malpractice premiums, the empirical
findings support the hypothesis that the cyclical nature of the insur-
ance market, correlating with the economy and investment success, is
most responsible for fluctuations in medical malpractice premiums.1 18
According to the Director of Insurance for the Consumer Federation
of America:
[T] he amounts charged for premiums do not track losses paid, but
instead rise and fall in concert with the state of the economy. When
the economy booms and investment returns are high, companies
maintain premiums at modest levels; however, when the economy
falters and interest rates fall, companies increase premiums. 119
Weiss Ratings concluded that the current increase in medical
malpractice premiums results primarily from six factors:
(1) medical inflation,
(2) the cyclical nature of the insurance market,
(3) the need to shore up reserves for policies already in force,
(4) declining investment income,
(5) overall financial safety concerns, and
(6) the supply and demand of coverage. 120
These six factors-rather than excessive litigation, the practice of de-
fensive medicine, or escalating jury verdicts-are most likely responsi-
ble for the increase in medical malpractice premiums. 12 1 Therefore,
reform measures aiming to reduce escalating premiums should con-
centrate on one or more of these factors.
118 See WEISS ET AL., supra note 23, at 3-4; Finley, supra note 10, at 1273 ("[I]t was the
combination of two powerful forces-under-reserving throughout most of the 1990s plus
the rapid fall in investment income in the 2000s-that largely drove the unusually rapid
premium increases... in medical malpractice.. .. " (quoting WEISS ET AL., supra note 23, at
10)).
119 Finley, supra note 10, at 1273-74.
120 WEISS ET AL., supra note 23, at 3-4.
121 See id.
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III
MEDICAL LIABIIY REFORM: STATE ENACTMENTS AND
PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION
FIGURE 3
STATES THAT HAVE ENACTED REFORMS TO JOINT-AND-SEVERAL
LIABIIITY AND THE COLIATERAI-SOURCE RuILE SINCE 1986
Collateral-Source Rule
-R Joint-and-Several Liability
* Collateral-Source Rule and
Joint-and-Several Liability
Source: Figure 1 in Congressional Budget Office, The Effects of Tort Reform: Evidence
from the States, cited in text at note 122, at 5. © Congressional Budget Office. Repro-
duced with permission.
A. Tort Reforms Enacted at the State Level
State tort reform initiatives began in the 1970s and continue to-
day.' 22 Although many state reform statutes solely address medical
malpractice liability, the plans vary and consist of one or more of the
following four reform initiatives. 123 First, over the past two decades,
thirty-eight states have passed statutes reforming joint and several lia-
bility, the common law doctrine under which each liable party is indi-
vidually responsible for the entire obligation to pay damages,
regardless of a party's actual degree of culpability. 124 Forty-two states
currently limit joint and several liability in some fashion.' 25 This re-
form aims to reduce the incentives for plaintiffs to join peripheral de-
122 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE
FROM THE STATES 3 [hereinafter EVIDENCE FROM THE STATEs], available at http:!/
www.cio.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=5549&type=l.
123 For a description of additional tort reform initiatives, see id. at 8. While many states
have experimented with measures such as restricting contingent fees, setting up victim
compensation funds, and providing for alternative dispute resolution, the effects of such
reforms have not been empirically analyzed yet. See id.
124 Id. at 4.
125 ld.
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fendants in hopes of taking advantage of the defendants' "deep
pockets." 26
Second, twenty-three states have abolished or changed the com-
mon law "collateral source" rule, which prohibits a defendant from
introducing evidence at trial that a plaintiff has already received com-
pensation for the injury in question from another source.' 27 Under
this rule, damages cannot be reduced by the amount of that compen-
sation. 128 The reform aims to prevent victims who have received com-
pensation from other sources, such as from medical insurance
settlements, from being overcompensated. 129
Third, thirty-four states have enacted reforms restricting punitive
damage awards. 130 Limitations include requiring a higher standard of
proof of malicious intent before such damages can be awarded, im-
posing a maximum amount of punitive damages that a victim can re-
cover, and, in some jurisdictions, banning punitive damages
altogether.' 3 '
Fourth, because of the perception that "unpredictable and ex-
travagant judgments" often result from claims of emotional harm,
twenty-three states have passed tort reforms placing caps on
noneconomic damage awards.' 3 2 The maximum amount varies from
$250,000 in Kansas 133 to $750,000 in Texas.' 34 Five states did strike
down these caps as unconstitutional, 135 but the remaining eighteen
states consider the caps justified.136
Although substantial reforms have taken place at the state level,
advocates of federal tort reform legislation argue that the patchwork
of individual state laws and the variability in their application hinders
efficiency by imposing unnecessary costs on businesses and pa-
tients. y37 Proponents of federal tort reform emphasize the benefits of
uniformity, citing the potential savings for businesses that provide
goods and services in multiple states, 38 and arguing that reform will
eliminate venue shopping in medical malpractice cases. 139
126 See id.
127 Id. at 5 fig.1.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 6.
130 Id. at 7.
131 Id. at 7-8.
132 Id. at 6.
133 Id.
134 Id.; Jean Hellwege, Med-Mal Caps in Two States Don't Reduce Insurance Rates, TRIAL,
FEB. 2004, at 14, 15.
135 EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES, supra note 122, at 6 n.16.
136 Id. at 6.
137 Id. at 2.
138 Id. at 3.
139 Id.
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FIGURE 4
STATES TiiAT HAvE ENACTED CAPS ON DAMAGES SINCE 1986
Punitive Damages
Noneconomic Damages
Ui Punitive and
Noneconomic Damages
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Source: Figure 7 in Congressional Budget Office, The Effects of Tort Reform: Evidence
from the States, cited in text at note 122, at 7. © Congressional Budget Office. Repro-
duced with permission.
B. Proposed Federal Reform: The HEALTH Act
Growing out of the belief that medical malpractice costs are ad-
versely affecting patients' access to care and increasing the cost of
health care, the reform initiatives of the proposed federal HEALTH
Act of 2005 aim to achieve the following objectives:
* Improve access to care
* Reduce physicians' practice of "defensive medicine"
* Reduce medical malpractice premiums for physicians
* Ensure equitable compensation for injury
* Enhance information sharing to reduce malpractice 40
To accomplish these objectives, the Act will implement the following
policies:
(1) Set the statute of limitations at "3 years after the date of
manifestation of the injury or 1 year after the claimant dis-
covers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should
have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first"'141
(2) Cap damages for noneconomic loss at $250,000142
(3) Limit lawyers' contingency fees 143
140 See Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of
2005, H.R. 534, 109th Cong. § 2(b) (2005).
141 Id. § 3.
142 Id. § 4(b).
143 Id. § 5(a).
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(4) Abolish joint and several liability, adopting a proportionate
liability standard instead 144
(5) Abolish the collateral source rule 145
(6) Eliminate the recovery of punitive damages except for cer-
tain intentional torts, 146 and specify the exclusive factors to
be considered in determining an appropriate amount of pu-
nitive damages 147 not to exceed $250,000 or "two times the
amount of economic damages awarded, whichever is
greater."148
Although the Act states that its provisions preempt applicable state
laws, 149 it provides an exception for state laws that "specif[y] a particu-
lar monetary amount of compensatory or punitive damages . . . that
may be awarded. . . , regardless of whether such monetary amount is
greater or lesser than is provided for under this Act . . 150
IV
EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF STATE TORT
REFORM INITIATIVES
Notwithstanding the significant disagreement about whether the
medical liability system is in crisis, the passage of the HEALTH Act in
the House clearly indicates that at least some members of Congress
sense a need for a national medical liability reform package. Assum-
ing, despite the foregoing discussion to the contrary, that a medical
liability crisis does in fact exist, this Part will assess whether the
HEALTH Act will be an effective solution to this crisis. This inquiry
will begin by analyzing the efficacy of comparable state reforms.
A. State Reform Initiatives: General Findings from Major Tort
Reform Studies, 1993-2005
The results from state-level reforms are mixed. Despite the impo-
sition of caps on damages, insurance premium rates have increased in
Florida and Texas. 151 National research supports these results by find-
144 Id. § 4(d).
145 Id. § 6. In the Senate version, this limitation allows collateral source agents to re-
cover money from the plaintiff if such action is not barred by state law. See S. 354, 109th
Cong. § 7 (2005).
146 H.R. 534, § 7 (a). The exception applies only if the tortfeasor "acted with malicious
intent to injure the claimant" or "deliberately failed to avoid unnecessary injury that such
person knew the claimant was substantially certain to suffer. Id.
147 Id. § 7(b)(1).
148 Id. § 7(b) (2). The House version of the Act also states that punitive damages will
not be awarded for products that comply with FDA standards. Id. § 7(c).
149 Id. § II(a).
150 See id. § 11(c)(1).
151 See Hellwege, supra note 134, at 16 (citing two 2003 studies, one conducted by
Weiss Ratings, and another conducted by the U.S. General Accounting Office).
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ing that medical malpractice premiums rose faster in states with caps
than in those without. 152 Moreover, in Texas, higher premium rates
have been accompanied by reduced insurance coverage and increased
deductibles. 153 Yet the AMA reports that upon implementing tort re-
form, the "crisis" states of Texas, West Virginia, and Ohio have wit-
nessed "less dramatic premium increases" and "some of the results
they hoped for" following the implementation of tort reform mea-
sures.1 54 The AMA also observes that improvements in access to care
in specialties such as obstetrics in Texas have mitigated the increased
insurance premiums.1 55 Despite these findings, however, significant
problems remain. 156
In recent years, several studies have assessed the impact of state-
level tort reforms.' 57 Yet several factors limit the applicability of these
studies' results. Studies restricted to a particular kind of tort claim do
not necessarily apply universally.15  For example, findings of the ef-
fects of tort reform on automobile injury cases do not necessarily ap-
ply to medical malpractice cases.1 59 Additionally, the effects of
specific reform measures are often uncertain because isolating one
reform's effects from those of other reforms or economic forces is
152 See Stewart, supra note 86, at 501-02 (citing WEISS ET AL., supra note 23).
153 See Hellwege, supra note 134, at 16 (citing anecdotal evidence).
154 Mike Norbut, Three Crisis States Show Improvement Since Tort Reform, AM. MED. NEWS,
Mar. 28, 2005, at 1.
155 See id.
156 See id. (citing an Ohio Department of Insurance report finding that "rising insur-
ance costs are still having an adverse effect on doctors and patients").
157 See Black et al., supra note 81, at 210 (arguing that "no crisis involving medical
malpractice claims occurred" in Texas and that the rise in premiums is more likely the
result of "insurance market dynamics" than of "litigation dynamics"); Patricia H. Born &
W. Kip Viscusi, The Distribution of the Insurance Market Effects of Tort Liability Reforms, 1998
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcriTV: MICROECONOMICS 55; Mark J. Browne & Robert
Puelz, The Effect of Legal Rules on the Value of Economic and Non-Economic Damages and the
Decision to File, 18 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 189 (1999); Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do
Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine? 111 Q.J. ECON. 353 (1996) (finding a 5 to 9% reduction
in medical expenditures "without substantial effects on mortality or medical complica-
tions" and concluding that tort reform can reduce the practice of defensive medicine);
Han-Duck Lee et al., How Does Joint and Several Tort Reform Affect the Rate of Tort Filings?
Evidence from the State Courts, 61 J. RISK & INS. 295 (1994) (conducting a regression analysis
based on nineteen states in the 1980s and finding a surge in tort filings in the year prior to
the implementation of tort reform and weak evidence of a reduction after the reforms); W.
Kip Viscusi et al., The Effect of 1980s Tort Reform Legislation on General Liability and Medical
Malpractice Insurance, 6 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 165 (1993); Albert Yoon, Damage Caps and
Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Medical Malpractice Litigation in the South, 3 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 199, 203 (2001) (concluding that from 1987 to 1999, damage awards in Ala-
bama decreased by roughly $20,000 after caps were imposed and then increased by
roughly $40,000 when the caps were lifted); Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical Malpractice
"Crisis": Recent Trends and the Impact of State Tort Reforms, 4 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVE),
W4-28, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.20vl.pdf (concluding that
capping awards would result in lower premiums than if awards were not capped).
158 See EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES, supra note 122, at vii.
159 See id.
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difficult, if not impossible. 160 Finally, researchers often use incom-
plete data sets, leading to highly uncertain conclusions. 161 These limi-
tations led the Congressional Budget Office, after reviewing many of
the studies cited here, 162 to state that "the findings [across states] are
not sufficiently consistent to be considered conclusive. " 1 6 3
The next section will review the findings of major tort reform
studies between 1993 and 2005, discussing what effect, if any, punitive
damage caps, changes to the collateral source rule, and the elimina-
tion of joint and several liability may have on achieving the reform
objectives. Because of the breadth of research on noneconomic dam-
age caps, an assessment of the effects of those caps will occur sepa-
rately, following the discussion of the effect of other reforms.
1. Limitation of Punitive Damage Caps
The effect of punitive damage caps on the rate of medical mal-
practice claims and insurer payouts remains indeterminate. Some re-
search finds that caps on punitive damage awards led to a significant
reduction in premiums for general liability insurance, but not for
medical malpractice insurance in particular.1 64 Other research does
not isolate the effect of punitive damage caps from the effects of other
reforms that yielded an increase in the insurer's profitability and a
reduction of malpractice premiums. 165 A final study, whose data set
consisted solely of automobile injury claims, finds that punitive dam-
age caps led to an increase in both the number of claims filed and
economic damages, but a decrease in noneconomic damages. 166
The automobile study, however, is likely to be minimally useful
here because studies have demonstrated that medical malpractice
claims sometimes follow a different trend from other types of tort
claims. 167 Indeed, a study of the nation's seventy-five largest counties
in 2001 found that while fifty-four plaintiffs in automobile cases in
state courts recovered punitive damages, only fifteen plaintiffs in med-
ical malpractice cases in the same sampling received such awards. 168
Moreover, only four of those medical malpractice plaintiffs received
jury awards over $250,000 in 2001.169 Finally, the actual payouts are
160 See id. at viii.
161 See id.
162 The Congressional Budget Office reviewed all the studies cited in note 157 supra,
except the study by Black and coauthors, supra note 81. See id. at viii.
163 Id. at vii.
164 Id. at x (citing Viscusi et al., supra note 157).
165 See id. at x (citing Born & Viscusi, supra note 157). These other reforms include
noneconomic damages, discussed infra Part IV.B.
166 Id. at xi (citing Browne & Puelz, supra note 157).
167 See id. at x (citing Viscusi et al., supra note 157).
168 COHEN & SMITH, supra note 77, at 6.
169 Id.
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likely to be substantially less that $250,000 because "high-low agree-
ments" cap defendant payouts in advance of trial. 170 Although tort
reformers argue that the presence of caps enhances the defense's bar-
gaining power in setting "high-low agreements," thereby resulting in
lower negotiated payouts when caps are in place, 171 that argument
carries minimal weight in light of the low number of punitive damage
awards over $250,000 even without caps.
2. Joint and Several Liability Reform
Despite several studies,172 researchers have been unable to con-
clusively determine what effect, if any,joint and several liability reform
has had on malpractice premiums. One researcher found that joint
and several liability reform lowered premiums for general liability in-
surers, but only reforms enacted in one of the three years studied had
a significant effect on malpractice premiums. 173 Another researcher
studying general tort filings noted that filings surged immediately
before the reform took effect, but that the reforms themselves had no
significant impact.' 7 4 A survey of automobile injury claims concluded
thatjoint and several liability reform led to an increase in the value of
noneconomic damages, but did not significantly affect the number of
claims filed. 175 Other researchers either did not isolate the effect of
joint and several liability reform from other reforms 76 or found no
statistically significant effect.177
3. Elimination or Reform of the Collateral Source Rule
Research on the effect of the collateral source rule on malprac-
tice premiums is also largely inconclusive. Some studies simply failed
to isolate the effect of such reform from the effects of other re-
forms. 178 One study, focused exclusively on automobile injury claims,
finds that reform of the collateral source rule correlates to a decrease
in the value of economic and noneconomic claims, although it has no
significant effect on the number of claims filed.179 Another study, fo-
cused exclusively on medical malpractice claims, finds that "discre-
170 See Hallinan, supra note 92.
171 See id.
172 See supra note 157 (listing studies).
173 EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES, supra note 122, at 17 (citing Viscusi et al., supra note
157).
'74 Id. at 12 (citing Lee et al., supra note 157).
175 Id. at 12 (citing Browne & Puelz, supra note 157).
176 See id. at x (citing Born & Viscusi, supra note 157); id. at xi (citing Kessler & McClel-
lan, supra note 157).
177 See id. at xi (citing Thorpe, supra note 157).
178 See id. at x-xi (citing Born & Viscusi, supra note 157; Kessler & McClellan, supra
note 157).
179 Id at xi. (citing Browne & Puelz, supra note 157).
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tionary" collateral source offsets1 80 enhance insurer profitability but
have no significant effect on premiums.18 1
Although the above studies 182 assessed the consequences of cap-
ping punitive damages, abolishing joint and several liability, and
changing the collateral source rule, most of the results were inconclu-
sive. The only reform to yield positive results was that of the collateral
source rule. Yet even that reform led only to greater profits for insur-
ers and not to a significant decrease in premiums. 8 3 Thus, insurers
captured all the benefit of the only successful reform without passing
that benefit on to consumers.
B. State Reform Initiatives: Findings on Noneconomic Damage
Caps, 1993-2005
Tort reformers have seen positive, albeit limited, results in re-
forms capping noneconomic damages. This type of reform is the
most frequent subject of study and one of the most contentious areas
of debate. Reformers promise that caps will bring substantial savings
to our health care system, while opponents of caps deny those
promises, instead emphasizing the harmful effects of caps on select
subpopulations. This subpart will focus on the impact of
noneconomic damage caps on the number of claims filed, plaintiffs'
recovery, the practice of defensive medicine, access to care, insurer
profitability, premiums, and vulnerable populations.
1. The Effect of Noneconomic Damage Caps on Number of Claims,
Plaintiffs' Recovery, the Practice of Defensive Medicine, and
Access to Care
Tort reformers' claims that capping noneconomic damages will
reduce the number of claims filed contradict the existing empirical
research.18 4 In fact, one study supports the conclusion that no relation
exists between caps on noneconomic damages and the number of
180 "Discretionary" collateral source offsets here are "those considered at ajudge's dis-
cretion." Id. (citing Thorpe, supra note 157).
181 Id. (citing Thorpe, supra note 157).
182 Cited supra note 157.
183 See EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES, supra note 122, at 13 (citing Thorpe, supra note
157).
184 Although one study found that noneconomic damage caps decreased the number
of claims filed, see Browne & Puelz, supra note 157, at 211, its data set consisted exclusively
of automobile accidents, id. at 191, rendering any comparison to medical liability highly
speculative.
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claims filed.18 5 Another study reports a decrease in plaintiffs' recov-
eries in medical malpractice cases when Alabama instituted
noneconomic damage caps.1 8 6
Additionally, although reformers argue that noneconomic dam-
age caps will reduce the practice of defensive medicine, leading to
cost savings in health care,18 7 only one of the surveyed studies corrob-
orated this assertion.' 8 8 Yet even that study's conclusion-that tort
reform led to cost savings without adverse health consequences in the
treatment of patients with ischemic heart disease-could not be re-
produced on a larger scale.' 89 Furthermore, the Congressional
Budget Office reports that it "has found no evidence that tort reforms
reduced medical spending."190
Moreover, tort reformers' predictions that tort reform will en-
hance access to care1 91 erroneously presuppose that the current levels
of care are inadequate. In fact, despite the public perception that a
problem exists and the media hype surrounding a few physician office
closings, 19 2 empirical evidence does not support the existence of a cri-
sis in either access to or availability of care.' 9 3 Specifically, the Gen-
eral Accounting Office's study of physician access in several
communities revealed that access to care has not been affected.19 4
Noneconomic damage caps cannot be touted as a solution to a prob-
lem that has not been proven to exist.
2. The Effect of Noneconomic Damage Caps on Insurer Profitability
and Premiums
While studies suggest that damage caps may enhance insurer
profitability, 195 this effect is likely to be much smaller than the effects
from other reform efforts or natural fluctuations in the insurance
market. Although several studies support the conclusion that damage
caps enhance insurer profitability by decreasing premiums and lower-
185 See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., IMPACT OF LEGAL REFORM ON MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE COSTS 64, available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/diskl/ 1993/9329/
9329.PDF.
186 EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES, supra note 122, at 15 (citing Yoon, supra note 157).
187 See supra notes 107-08.
188 See Kessler & McClellan, supra note 157; see also studies cited supra note 157.
189 EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES, supra note 122, at 19 (citing Kessler & McClellan, supra
note 157).
190 Id.
191 See Finley, supra note 10, at 1267.
192 See Stailey, supra note !1, at 188, 191.
193 See Finley, supra note 10, at 1271.
194 See supra note 105 and accompanying text ("[T]here has not been any document-
able adverse effect on access to health care, except in some scattered, often rural areas,
where factors other than malpractice premiums contribute to the access issues.").
195 See EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES, supra note 122, at 17-18 (citing Born & Viscusi,
supra note 157; Thorpe, supra note 157; Viscusi et al., supra note 157).
11872006]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ing insurer loss ratios,19 6 some of these studies may be unreliable be-
cause they use old data, 197 or because the results may be due to other
reform efforts, such as the elimination of the collateral source rule.19 8
Additionally, the majority of the studies do not engage the alternative
theory that premium fluctuations reflect the cyclical nature of the in-
surance market and economic fluctuations, rather than an increasing
number of claims or larger jury awards. 199 This alternate theory is
supported by a 2005 study that found a "weak connection between
claims-related costs and short-to-medium-term fluctuations in insur-
ance premiums."200 The authors of that study inferred that the insur-
ance premium spike likely resulted from "insurance market dynamics,
not litigation dynamics." 201
Moreover, findings from states that impose noneconomic dam-
age caps on jury verdicts show that these caps have failed to decrease
or stabilize medical malpractice premiums. For example, after the
Nevada Legislature passed a tort reform bill in 2002 that included
caps on noneconomic damages of $350,000, three of the state's major
insurance companies requested rate increases. 20 2 More generally,
Weiss Ratings found that premiums grew faster in states that had en-
acted tort reform statutes than in states that did not enact such initia-
tives. 203 Furthermore, they found that damage awards comprised only
a fraction of the premium costs.
Professor Lucinda Finley notes that insurers themselves rarely
claim that caps on damages will reduce or stabilize malpractice premi-
ums.20 4 Indeed, the President of the American Tort Reform Associa-
tion has "cautioned that the reason to pass tort reform [was not] to
reduce insurance rates."205 This may be because, as major insurers in
Florida discovered, most jury awards and settlements occur below the
statutory caps. 20 6 When considering a damage cap of $450,000, these
insurance companies realized that the cap would affect very few of
196 See supra note 195.
197 See EVDENCE FROM THE STATES, supra note 122, at 17 (citing Viscusi et al., supra note
157, who cite data from 1985 to 1988).
198 See id. at 18 (citing Thorpe, supra note 157, who finds that the change in the collat-
eral source rule led to a 13.3% lower insurer's loss ratio than other states experienced).
199 See WEIsS ET AL., supra note 23, at 9.
200 Black et al., supra note 81, at 210.
201 Id.
202 See Finley, supra note 10, at 1276-77.
203 See WEISS ET AL., supra note 23, at 7-8.
204 See Finley, supra note 10, at 1275.
205 Id. at 1276 (quotation omitted).
206 See id. at 1275 (referring to St. Paul's determination that a proposed cap in Florida
would have affected only 4 of 313 claims).
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their claims 20 7 and concluded that it would have "no effect ' on medi-
cal malpractice premium rates. 20 8
3. The Effect of Noneconomic Damage Caps on Vulnerable
Populations
In addition to arguing that noneconomic damage caps fail to
solve the problem of rising medical malpractice premiums, Professor
Finley also argues that caps disproportionately harm certain classes of
tort victims. 20 9 Professor Finley's empirical analysis of jury verdicts in
California demonstrates that a greater proportion of jury damage
awards given to women and elderly individuals are noneconomic dam-
ages; by contrast, economic damages are more likely to compensate
the dominant wage earners, younger men, adequately. 210 This proves
especially true for many classically "female" injuries, such as the grief
and emotional harm resulting from rape or from obstetrical-gyneco-
logical and reproductive problems that are compensated only in
noneconomic damages because they generally do not entail lost
wages. 211 Even in the elderly population, which is less likely to incur
significant wage loss, elderly women receive a greater proportion of
their damages as noneconomic than elderly men.2 12 Caps on
noneconomic damages will thus disproportionately affect women, the
elderly, and other populations whose damages are more likely to be
apportioned for emotional harms rather than lost wages.213
Recent studies show that noneconomic damage caps have draco-
nian consequences for those who suffer the most devastating injuries
or significant loss to their quality of life. 214 The caps prevent the most
deserving plaintiffs from receiving equitable compensation for their
injuries. 21 5 For example, the parents of a child killed because of med-
ical malpractice will not be able to recover more than the $250,000
statutory cap on noneconomic damages, despite the gravity of the
loss. 2 16 Caps also discourage plaintiffs' lawyers from representing
members of vulnerable populations in the first place, further limiting
these groups' ability to receive compensation for their harm.21 7 A tort
system limited by caps on noneconomic damages perpetuates societal
207 See id.
208 Id. at 1276 (quotation omitted).
209 See id. at 1283.
210 See id. 1283-84.
211 See id.
212 See id. at 1283.
213 See id. at 1283-84.
214 See Boehm, supra note 12, at 360.
215 See id. at 360 & n.16.
216 See Finley, supra note 10, at 1313.
217 See id. at 1284, 1313.
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injustice by disproportionately reducing or eliminating compensation
for members of vulnerable populations.218
C. The Impact of Tort Reform on Public Perception and the
Tort System
In recent years, some scholars have begun to study the impact of
public perception on tort filings and jury verdicts. These scholars pos-
tulate that the tort reform movement is, at root, a message to society
about the proper contours of our civil justice system in compensating
individuals for harms. Thus, the public's views about the effectiveness
of the justice system in compensating deserving individuals fairly and
equitably are critical.21 9
Although there is little conclusive evidence, a few scholars have
attempted to measure the impact of public perception on changes in
litigation dynamics. 220 Some have analyzed media messages, advertis-
ing campaigns, and similar platforms for public expression in order to
expose the messages underlying these public campaigns, and to better
understand their effects on the public.22' This research reveals the
numerous strategies tort reform advocates employ to spread their
message, as well as the way American notions of individual responsibil-
ity and independence make American audiences receptive to reform-
ers' messages. 222 For example, the manner in which the media
discussed and mocked the highly publicized McDonald's coffee cup
case is paradigmatic of public campaigns that seek to highlight the
overly litigious nature of the tort system, runaway jury verdicts, and
the financial burdens that a supposedly out-of-control legal system
places on ordinary Americans. 223
In other efforts, Professors Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin
designed empirical research studies in order to quantify the
nonformal impact of tort reforms. 224 This nonformal impact consists
of the effect of public perception on the "market" environment of tort
218 See id. at 1313.
219 See Daniels & Martin, Ears, supra note 62, at 491; see also Shari Seidman Diamond et
al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Con-
sistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 309 (1998) (finding that the strongest predictor ofjuror
liability decisions was the jurors' beliefs about "whether plaintiffs generally receive too
much or too little in a lawsuit"), discussed in Daniels & Martin, Ears, supra note 62, at 456
n.1l.
220 See, e.g., Daniels & Martin, Ears, supra note 62; Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin,
The Strange Success of Tort Reform, 53 EMORY L.J. 1225 (2004) [hereinafter Daniels & Martin,
Success]; McCann et al., supra note 64.
221 See McCann et al., supra note 64, at 115-16.
222 See id. at 116-17.
223 See id. at 113-15.
224 Daniels & Martin, Ears, supra note 62; Daniels & Martin, Success, supra note 220.
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claims.2 2 5 Professors Daniels and Martin studied tort reform initia-
tives in Texas from the mid 1980s to 2003, and hypothesized that
those initiatives changed behavior in ways that were unrelated to the
specific reform elements. 2 26 They conclude that, as the public percep-
tion of the need for and impetus behind tort reform heightens, public
belief in tort reformers' arguments ultimately alters the power dynam-
ics among litigants, the caseload, and the composition of the plain-
tiffs, independently of formal changes in the law.
2 27
When considering the Daniels and Martin research in light of
Black and his coauthors' observation that filings in Texas and jury
awards changed little during a similar period,2 28 one might conclude
that public perception affects plaintiffs' lawyers' client base and case
load, but does not significantly affect the system overall. On the other
hand, tort filings have been declining nationally since 1995, even with-
out state or national measures to curb such filings. 229 Accordingly,
one may argue that tort reformers' public campaign has affected pub-
lic perception about the need for tort reform and consequently
changed behavior.
If changes in perception affect the tort market, then the strategy
of tort reformers is apt to change drastically. To prove more defini-
tively this perception hypothesis, however, the Daniels and Martin
study must be repeated in states that have not enacted tort reform
initiatives. Until then, the effects of the nonformal mechanisms of
public perception on the tort market remain largely speculative.
225 Daniels & Martin, Success, supra note 220, at 1262.
226 See id. at 1228. The study focused on automobile injury tort claims rather than
medical malpractice claims. Id. Yet, Daniels and Martin chose to study automobile cases
precisely because such claims had not been the target of reform. See id. The authors hy-
pothesize that tort reform alters public perceptions so broadly that the market environ-
ment changes even for torts that were not directly reformed. Id. The study thus provides a
useful theoretical framework with which to analyze the impact of the tort reform move-
ment on public perception.
227 For example, they found that plaintiffs' lawyers in Texas believed that media cam-
paigns, which favored tort reform, hindered their chances to receive favorable jury ver-
dicts. See id. at 1242-44. In light of this perception of jury sympathy, plaintiffs' lawyers
surmised that insurance companies would be less likely to settle in advance of trial. See id.
at 1242-43. As a result, attorneys tightened their gatekeeping function, choosing to take
only those cases that they strongly believed would be successful in front of a jury. See id. at
1229. Consequently, clients whom juries are likely to disfavor-such as criminals, unem-
ployed individuals, or individuals on welfare-are now less able to have their cases taken
up by plaintiffs' lawyers, who believe they are unlikely to recover their fees through success
injury trials. See id. at 1257-59. On the other hand, changing perceptions about the im-
portance of tort reform have led to an increase in the number of medical malpractice
specialists. See id. at 1253. One medical malpractice lawyer explained that reform in-
creases the demand for specialists "because it makes it so hard for marginal or medium-
sized firms that don't specialize in it and who don't know all the traps, and who can't
handle the expense." See id. at 1254.
228 See Black et al., supra note 81 (studying claims from 1988 to 2002).
229 See Daniels & Martin, Success, supra note 220, at 1226.
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V
EVALUATING PROPOSED FEDERAL MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM
LEGISLATION: THE HEALTH ACT
Certain that we are in the midst of a medical liability crisis, re-
form advocates crafted the HEALTH Act in an effort to reduce pre-
mium increases, curb the filing of medical malpractice lawsuits, and
increase the availability of care.230 Opponents of reform do not be-
lieve that the current health care crisis reflects problems in our legal
system, deny reports of shortages of care, and attribute current pre-
mium increases to the state of the economy and the cyclical nature of
the insurance market.231 Although both sides agree that premiums
have been escalating rapidly in the past few years, the reasons for this
trend remain in dispute.
Considering these conflicting views of the facts, legislators must
decide whether to adopt a national reform package such as the
HEALTH Act or leave the states to adopt reform packages in response
to their own problems, while gathering data on the effects of those
reforms. This Note postulates that the latter approach is
preferable. 232
A. The HEALTH Act: Forecasting the Effectiveness of Reform
Proposals
Regardless of whether a medical liability crisis actually exists, ris-
ing premiums and anecdotal accounts of shortages in medical care
have led to calls for reform. But empirical evidence of the failure of
tort reform at the state level reveals that the Act will fail to meet many
of its objectives. First, the effect that caps on punitive damage awards
will have on plaintiffs' recovery is uncertain. 23 3 Indeed, one study
found that these caps would actually increase tort filings.234 Moreover,
because fewjuries award punitive damages, such caps might not signif-
icantly reduce insurers' overall costs. 235 Second, state-level changes to
230 Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2005,
H.R. 534, 109th Congress (2005).
231 See supra Part II.
232 An analysis of the constitutional implications of federal government action in tort
reform is beyond the scope of this Note. For a brief discussion of constitutional concerns
raised by conservatives, see RANDOLPH W. PATE & DEREK HUNTER, HERITAGE FOUND., EXEC-
UTIVE SUMMARY BACKGROUNDER No. 1908, CODE BLUE: THE CASE FOR SERIOUS STATE MEDI-
CAL LIABILITY REFORM (2006), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/healthcare/
bg1908.cfm.
233 See EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES, supra note 122, at 12-13.
234 See id. at 15 (citing Browne & Puelz, supra note 157) ("Caps on punitive dam-
ages . . . increased the likelihood that a claim would be filed-from 2.7 percent to 4
percent.").
235 See COHEN & SMITH, supra note 77, at 2 tbl.7 (reporting that punitive damages were
awarded in only fifteen cases in the seventy-five largest counties in 2001). Although me-
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joint and several liability have yielded no discernible consequences. 236
Third, only one study supports reforming the collateral source rule to
allow for discretionary collateral source offsets in order to decrease
insurer loss ratios, and even that study found that such reform yields
no corresponding reduction in premiums.237 Fourth, despite evi-
dence from a study that caps on noneconomic damages can enhance
insurer profitability, the same study revealed that this enhanced prof-
itability did not result in lower malpractice premiums for physi-
cians.238 Fifth, despite an objective to increase information sharing,
the HEALTH Act does not incorporate any specific steps to meet this
objective. 239 Finally, the HEALTH Act's opt-out provision, which al-
lows states to set their own noneconomic and punitive damage
caps, 2 40 limits the benefits that would flow from a uniform federal
policy.
In general, empirical findings from state-level tort reforms sug-
gest that the HEALTH Act will not decrease tort filings, reduce overall
health costs, reduce plaintiffs' net recoveries, or increase access to
care. Moreover, rather than making the system more equitable so
that:"persons with meritorious health care injury claims receive fair
and adequate compensation," 241 the HEALTH Act could enhance in-
surer profitability at the expense of members of vulnerable popula-
tions.242 By implementing changes that are unlikely to remedy large-
scale problems in our health care system while having a strong poten-
tial to affect many individuals adversely, the HEALTH Act assaults the
fundamental precept of the tort system: to fairly and equitably com-
pensate victims who have suffered injuries or death.
B. The Unintended Consequences of Reform: Changes in Public
Perception
Defining the elements of the HEALTH Act is an exercise in
Orwellian doublespeak. The Act is phrased artfully to lead unsuspect-
ing readers to false conclusions. For example, the Act states that the
dian punitive damage awards for medical malpractice are $187,000 when awarded, id., the
infrequency of punitive damage awards limits the potential savings available to insurance
companies because of caps. While insurance companies might see some savings because of
caps, those savings are likely to be small.
236 See EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES, supra note 122, at 12-13 (citing Browne & Puelz,
supra note 157; Lee et al., supra note 157; Thorpe, supra note 157).
237 See id. at 13 (citing Thorpe, supra note 157); supra Part IV.A.3.
238 See id. (citing Viscusi et al., supra note 157). But see id.
239 See Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of
2005, H.R. 534, 109th Congress (2005).
240 Id. § ll(c)(1).
241 Id. § 2(b) (3).
242 See supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the disproportionate effect of noneconomic dam-
age caps on vulnerable populations).
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hard cap on noneconomic damages allows plaintiffs to recover "as
much as $250,000,"243 rather than "not more than $250,000." Similarly,
the statute of limitations in the Act occurs underneath the heading
"Encouraging Speedy Resolution of Claims,"244 instead of a more ac-
curate title such as "Limiting the Timeframe for Claim Filing." Thus,
the drafters seem to understand the effect of public perception on the
tort movement and have used this artful language to further their
message. 245 Rather than appearing to take damages away from those
who most deserve them, the Act is phrased to imply an intent to de-
liver "fair and adequate compensation" to all who deserve it.246
While touting the HEALTH Act as a reform package aimed at
stemming the tide of out-of-control jury awards and an unmanageable
litigation system may serve reformers' goals in the short term, a na-
tional initiative such as the HEALTH Act and its accompanying public
relations spin could hinder tort reformers' objectives. Reformers who
aim to affect the hearts and minds of potential jurors may win the
public relations battle but lose the courtroom war. In the absence of
national legislation, and with varied reform provisions across the vari-
ous states, tort reformers have decried the harmful effects of an un-
checked legal system gone amok due to frivolous lawsuits and
outrageous jury awards. Professors Daniels and Martin hypothesize
that these media campaigns constrict the tort system by informally
changing the market environment in which litigation occurs. 247
Once a national tort reform measure is passed, however, the pleas
of these reformers are likely to fall upon deaf ears. The public-par-
ticularly jurors-may not believe that the legal system is out of con-
trol because the publicity following the passage of national tort reform
initiatives will likely portray excessive jury awards as a problem solved.
Ironically, such publicity may cause jurors to be less vigilant in keep-
ing awards low and to feel less responsible for policing their own ac-
tions. If jurors believe that tort reform has fixed the problems in our
civil justice system, then jurors will be less likely to worry about con-
tributing to unmeritorious awards or windfalls for plaintiffs. Thus, the
pressure that the public climate currently exerts on plaintiffs' attor-
neys to try only the most meritorious claims may subside. Conse-
quently, if the Daniels and Martin thesis about the effects of
perception on the tort system is correct, jurors' increasing tendency to
side with plaintiffs will boost plaintiffs' attorneys confidence in their
ability to win, thus causing the very changes in the tort market that
243 See H.R. 534, § 4(b) (emphasis added).
244 Id. § 3.
245 Cf supra Part lV.C. (discussing attempts to shape public perception as a critical
goal of tort reform).
246 H.R. 534, § 2(b)(3).
247 See Daniels & Martin, Ears, supra note 62, at 491-92.
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tort reformers criticize, such as an increase in the number of claims
filed.
VI
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE HEALTH
CARE CRIsIs
This Note calls into question the existence of a medical liability
crisis, postulating instead that problems in our health care system may
be attributable to a variety of other factors, including insurance cycles
fluctuating with the economy and systemic problems in the design of
our health care payment and delivery systems. Even if one believes,
however, that the current crisis in health care emanates from an out-
of-control tort system, current tort reform proposals are unlikely to
present an effective solution. Data from state-level reforms provide an
uncertain picture of the benefits and drawbacks of tort reform initia-
tives, with most initiatives seeming to have little effect. Rather than
adopting a national reform whose outcome is, at best, uncertain, the
most appropriate course of action is to develop greater certainty over
which measures will be effective. Therefore, this Note argues that na-
tional medical liability reforms such as the HEALTH Act should not
be adopted; instead, states should engage in broad-based monitoring
of tort reform measures and, when necessary, initiate modest state-
level reforms geared toward tempering the rise in litigation defense
costs, slowing premium rate increases, and decreasing the rate of
claims of medical malpractice. This Note delineates specific sugges-
tions for state-level reforms below.
A. Research and Monitor Reform Initiatives and Other Factors
Affecting the Interaction Between the Medical and Legal
Systems
Above all, states should implement systematic efforts to monitor
the effects of their reform initiatives. This monitoring should include
assessments of both the formal and nonformal impacts of tort reform
measures. Such assessments could test the theory that public percep-
tion affects the market environment of tort claims. 248 Moreover, re-
searchers should closely study alternative factors affecting the
relationship between the medical and legal systems, such as rising de-
fense costs, to determine the truth of claims that rising litigation de-
fense costs are driving premium rate increases. 249 Research on these
questions could provide greater clarity as to the path that any reform
effort should take, if needed.
248 See supra Part IV.C.
249 See, e.g., Nathanson, supra note 83, at 1078.
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B. Initiate Systemic Change: Reducing Medical Error
Our health care system is in trouble. Rising costs, increasing
numbers of uninsured, the proliferation of new and expensive tech-
nologies, and widespread poor health outcomes demand broad sys-
temic change. 250 Ambitious policy proposals for overhauling the
health care system are beyond the scope of this Note. The health care
system can take steps to reduce its exposure to medical liability, how-
ever, by implementing systemic change at the state level to reduce the
rate of medical error.2 5 1 One possible change would be to institute a
risk management program to review hospital practices, resolve in-
stances of medical error, and design safety programs to lower the risk
of error.252 Reducing medical error may reduce the number of medi-
cal malpractice claims filed because, absent medical error, a malprac-
tice claim is unlikely to survive a motion for summaryjudgment.2 53
C. Screen Malpractice Claims to Reduce Frivolous Lawsuits
Because the early detection of frivolous claims may reduce the
number of claims filed, states should require every plaintiff in a mal-
practice action to file a certificate of their claim with an expert who
will verify that the claim is meritorious. 254 This will reduce insurance
companies' expenditures on defending frivolous claims. 255 As of
2004, approximately fifteen states required such certificates. 256 In Ma-
ryland, malpractice filing rates dropped 36% in the year after these
certificates became mandatory.257 One major benefit of this reform is
that it targets one of the very concerns that animates current calls for
tort reform: frivolous lawsuits.2 58 Additionally, unlike other efforts to
reduce claims, such as caps on noneconomic or punitive damages, this
reform is likely to reduce malpractice claims without disparately dis-
advantaging those who suffer primarily from emotional harms. 259
250 See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
251 For a discussion of the prevalence of medical error, see supra notes 33-35 and
accompanying text.
252 See COUNCIL OF STATE GoV'TS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS 15 (2003), available at
http://www.csg.org/NR/rdonlyres/ek7ao3dfatxrcgh656amm6vnlw2owndpku4rp3xhss32r
zeche5ggb4j4mbwdozh4zsobfboqxysz3bnp5corc6rrae/Medical+Malpractice+%28May+Re-
vised%29.pdf.
253 Cf id at 14 ("One overlooked aspect of [the] medical malpractice insurance situa-
tion is the existence of medical malpractice.").
254 See Nathanson, supra note 83, at 1111.
255 See id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 See id.
259 See supra Part IV.B.3.
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D. Abolish the Collateral Source Rule
States may consider abolishing the common law collateral source
rule in certain cases, instead adopting a discretionary collateral source
rule that allows the judge to exercise discretion in allowing parties to
present information about payments from a collateral source into evi-
dence. 260 This proposal was one of the few reforms that studies re-
vealed has some potential to reduce loss ratios (though even this
reform has not led to reduced premiums in states in which it has been
enacted) .261 The discretion inherent in this rule would allow judges
to properly balance equity and efficiency in accordance with the
needs of individual cases.
E. Allow Physicians to Self-Insure
Another means of shielding physicians from exorbitant premium
rate increases set by insurance companies is to allow physicians to self-
insure. For example, in 2003, members of the Florida Congress pro-
posed removing a legislative provision that prohibited doctors from
self-insuring. 262 Such a reform would allow doctors to group together
to establish their own insurance pool. Florida Senator Daniel Webster
estimates that if 40,000 doctors contributed $25,000 annually in pre-
miums to a self-insurance fund, they would collect $1 billion annu-
ally.2613 Because Florida medical malpractice insurers paid out only
$352 million in 2002, such an insurance fund would be more than
adequate to cover malpractice liability.2 64 Furthermore, as one Flor-
ida lawyer put it, "'[T] he creation of a self-insurance trust fund ...
was the single piece of legislation that solved the 'insurance crisis'
back in the 1970's."' 265 Such a measure thus holds great promise for
solving the crisis of rising health care costs and decreasing availability
of care today.
260 Discretionary collateral source rules have been adopted in Idaho, Indiana, and Or-
egon. See Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, Collateral Source Rule Reform, http://www.atra.org/
show/7344 (last visited Apr. 4, 2006). Collateral source evidence is admissible as evidence
and as an offset in these ten states, although exclusions may apply: Alabama, Alaska, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, NewJersey, New York, North Dakota, and Ohio. Id. The
following eight states make some provisions for the introduction of collateral source evi-
dence, albeit with numerous varying restrictions: Arizona, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Mich-
igan, Minnesota, Missouri, and Montana. Id.
261 See EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES, supra note 122, at 18 (citing Thorpe, supra note
157).
262 See Diane Hirth, California Gives Insight on Medical Malpractice, TALLAHASSEE DEMO-
CRAT, June 8, 2003, at Al.
263 Paige St. John, Foorida Doctors Will Pay Higher Insurance Rates, GANNE-T-r NEws SER-
VICE, Apr. 12, 2003, available at http://www.floridacapitalnews.com/legislature2003/sto-
ries/041403insurance.htm.
264 See id.
265 Hellwege, supra note 134, at 16 (quoting Neal Roth, a lawyer who lobbied against
damage caps).
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F. Reduce Litigation Defense Costs
Professor Mitchell Nathanson insists that the key to addressing
medical malpractice insurer insolvency is creating solutions to curb
rising defense costs. 266 He agrees with reformers that the economy
and the insurance market's cyclical nature alone cannot explain rising
insurance premiums,267 but he disagrees with most tort reform pro-
posals, such as capping noneconomic damages. 268 Instead, he asserts
that insurance companies should focus on curbing litigation defense
costs to enhance insurer profitability. 269 He reasons that medical mal-
practice insurers suffer 40% of their losses in defense costs, in contrast
with other types of insurers, whose defense costs account for approxi-
mately 12 to 13% of their losses. 270
Professor Nathanson's proposal is compelling in light of the em-
pirical evidence on litigation defense costs. From 1986 to 2002, de-
fense costs increased approximately 8% annually, with average costs
per claim rising from $8,000 to $27,000.271 Although only 5% of med-
ical malpractice cases go to trial each year, 272 and defendants win 73%
of the time, 273 insurance companies expend 40% of their total losses
on defense costs. 274 Even a case that the parties settle before trial, or
one that the insurance company wins, costs a significant amount of
money to defend. The Congressional Budget Office reports that in
2002, insurers spent $22,000 defending claims that did not result in
payouts and $39,000 in claims that did.275 These defense costs are in
addition to settlement and jury award payouts. 2 7 6 Thus, the mere fil-
ing of claims significantly affects defense costs, independently of how
often plaintiffs recover damages.
Additionally, one study's findings that defense costs rose 4.4%
per large claim per year in Texas between 1988 and 2002 demon-
strated that the number of large claims can significantly raise insurers'
costs. 277 On the other hand, the number of large claims, as well as the
mean and median payouts for large claims, remained relatively stable
266 See Nathanson, supra note 83, at 1091.
267 See id. at 1086.
268 See id. at 1092.
269 See id.
270 See id. at 1091-92.
271 LIMITING TORT LIABILITY, supra note 53, at 4.
272 Finley, supra note 10, at 1268-69.
273 See COHEN & SMITH, supra note 77, at 4 (providing data for the nation's seventy-five
largest counties in 2001).
274 Nathanson, supra note 83, at 1091.
275 LIMITING TORT LIABILITY, supra note 53, at 4 n.6.
276 The National Practitioner Data Bank reports that in 2000, the median payout was
$125,000 when the parties settled and $235,000 when ajudgment was rendered. See Stew-
art, supra note 86, at 502.
277 Black et al., supra note 81, at 244.
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over the 15-year period, while the number of small claims declined
significantly,2 78 leading the researchers to conclude that the change in
the number or cost of malpractice claims did not cause the spike in
malpractice insurance premiums in Texas.279 They further state that
"[n]o sudden rise in ... defense costs preceded or accompanied the
premium spike that occurred in Texas after 1998."280
These researchers are likely correct that rising defense costs
alone cannot explain the post-2001 premium spikes; however, their
conclusion does not foreclose the possibility that rising defense
costs-especially for large claims-raised insurers' loss ratios and
could have contributed to rising premium costs. At the very least, the
data suggest that defense costs could significantly affect malpractice
premiums. Future studies should seek to support or disprove this hy-
pothesis so that reform measures can take into account defense costs.
G. Regulate Insurance Companies
Some scholars assert that more robust state regulation of insur-
ance companies will prevent exponential premium rate increases that
adversely affect physicians.281 Many also view California's passage of
strong insurance regulations in 1988, including a 20% rollback of in-
surance rates, as a model of effective insurance regulation because
premium rate increases in California have remained lower than in
other states.282 This leveling of premium rate increases occurred only
after the passage of state insurance regulation in 1988, rather than
following the enactment of tort reforms in 1975, suggesting that insur-
ance regulation, rather than tort reform, is the driving force control-
ling insurance premiums. 283
Weiss Ratings' 2003 study, which found that noneconomic dam-
age caps were ineffective in controlling premium rate increases, sup-
ports this proposal.284 Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which
prohibits federal regulation of insurance carriers, increasing regula-
tion of the insurance industry must occur at the state level. 28 5 Because
278 See id. at 252.
279 See id. at 255.
280 Id.
281 See Boehm, supra note 12, at 368.
282 See Diane Hirth, California Gives Insight on Medical Malpractice, TALLAHASSEE DEMO-
cwAT, June 8, 2003, at Al; Janice F. Mulligan, The "New" Medical Malpractice Insurance
Crisis: Are California Reforms Good for the Nation? Maybe, But Not the Ones You Have
Been Hearing Most About, Presentation to the Health Law Section of the American Bar
Association (Feb. 21, 2003), available at http://ww.janmulligan.com/new~malpractice-
crisis.pdf.
283 See Mulligan, supra note 282.
284 WEiss ET AL., supra note 23.
285 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2000).
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the insurance industry reported record profits in 2004,286 regulation
aimed at curtailing insurance industry profit-margins is unlikely to
jeopardize the industry's financial health. 28 7 The Center forJustice &
Democracy notes that "[d] espite a weak economy and soaring medical
costs, U.S. health insurers have raked in earnings at a far greater pace
than the rest of corporate America, with annual profits and margins
doubling in the last four years."288
In July of 2004, a coalition of public interest groups united as
Americans for Insurance Reform, together with the Center for Justice
& Democracy, sent letters to state insurance commissioners requesting
that they initiate the following insurance reform efforts:
(1) Undertake a review of rate levels to determine if rates are ex-
cessive in any line of insurance ....
(2) Initiate an investigation into anti-competitive behavior of in-
surance companies in making statements and other acts to
hold off competition ....
(3) If any insurer files a rate request in excess of current inflation
for that line of insurance, a rate hearing should be called ....
(4) [B]egin the process of careful analysis as to what led to this
most recent cycle, and your department's role in it[,] by al-
lowing rates to fluctuate between excessive (such as now at the
end of the hard market) and inadequate (such as right before
the turn in the market from soft to hard)....
(5) Review successes from other states in averting the same sort of
price spikes you may have endured over the last two years. 289
Additionally, in March of 2005, the Center for Justice & Democracy
recommended that state insurance commissioners implement these
reforms:
[Perform a] full and thorough investigation of the insurance
companies' data to determine if there are errors in the data and
over-reserving, and whether their business and investment prac-
tices present unacceptable financial risks for insurance consum-
286 Press Release, Ctr. for Justice & Democracy, Mythbuster: New 2004 Data Shows
Insurance Industry Profits are the Highest Ever (Oct. 20, 2004), available at http://
centerjd.org/free/mythbusters-free/InsProfitsHighestEver.pdf.
287 See Boehm, supra note 12, at 368.
288 Ctr. for Justice & Democracy, supra note 286 (quoting Russ Britt, Health Insurers
Getting Bigger Cut of Medical Dollars, INVEsTOR's Bus. DuALY, Oct. 15, 2004, available at http://
investors.com/breakingnews.asp?journalid=23544168&brk= l).
289 Letter from J. Robert Hunter, Dir. of Ins., Consumer Fed'n of Am., & Birny Birn-
baum, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Econ. Justice, to Ins. Comm'rs of 50 States & D.C. 6 (May 11,
2004), available at http://insurance-reform.org/AIRIns Comm_04.pdf, quoted in Boehm,
supra note 12, at 369. The letter also requested that the state insurance commissions
"[a]lert [their] legislature[s] to the end of the hard market and advise them that there is
no need to rush into legislative fixes, such as legal limits on victims' rights." Id., quoted in
Boehm, supra note 12, at 369.
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ers and shareholders by failing to take into account cyclical
economic downturns ....
" [Perform] annual audits of insurance companies to ascertain
whether the companies are engaging in questionable accounting
practices ....
* [Regulate the e]xcessive prices . . . charged by insurers today
" [Allow] the public . . . the opportunity to participate in rate
hearings ....
" [Require mledical malpractice insurers [to] use claims history as
a rating factor, and ... give that factor significant weight ....
* [Establish a] state consumer advocate... in the Insurance Com-
missioner's office to monitor insurance industry waste, ineffi-
ciencies and price-gouging. 290
States should initiate some or all of these reform efforts.
The proposals discussed above reflect the practical conclusion
that fewer claims, reduced premiums, and lower litigation costs will
reduce costs in the system as a whole. This targeted approach to state-
level cost reduction recognizes the need for cost containment in our
health care system while preserving the role of the tort system as a
vehicle for compensating those who are wrongly injured.
CONCLUSION
Tort reformers and those who stand opposed to reform can find
common ground in the recognition that the current system of medi-
cal care in the United States appears to be in trouble. Disagreement
arises, however, over the origins of the problem, and thus an effective
solution. Presenting evidence that the supposed relationship between
the tort system and problems in health care cost and access is more
myth than reality, this Note argues that the crisis in medical care ema-
nates from a broken health care system, not a broken legal one. Reduc-
ing medical liability will not increase national competitiveness or
decrease health care costs, as the tort system constitutes only two per-
cent of overall health spending. Moreover, there is little evidence that
reform measures will achieve meaningful savings through a reduction
in the practice of defensive medicine. Additionally, there is little evi-
dence that reducing the number of medical malpractice cases filed
annually or capping jury awards will contribute to a decline in mal-
practice premiums.
290 Press Release, Ctr. forJustice & Democracy, Mythbuster: What's the Answer? Insur-
ance Regulation (Mar. 19, 2005), available at http://centerjd.org/RegAnswer.pdf.
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Finally, even if a medical liability crisis does exist, evidence from
state-level reforms suggests that current tort reform proposals will be
inadequate to solve the problems identified. Accordingly, federal
medical liability reform is not yet appropriate; rather, in states where
premiums continue to soar and anecdotal evidence of the decreasing
availability of care flourishes, state legislators should develop and re-
fine tort reform packages as necessary to address their particular
states' needs. In order for these state experiences to prove valuable,
well developed empirical studies must be designed and implemented
to track state initiatives. Such studies will inform policymaking by
presenting data of successful or unsuccessful reforms, and will assist
subsequent states in reproducing successful results. If premiums con-
tinue to rise nationally, and if better evidence emerges that this pre-
mium increase is responsible for reducing the availability of health
care, then it may be appropriate to reconsider federal tort reform leg-
islation. At such a point, reform initiatives by states acting as "labora-
tories of democracy"291 will provide guidance to federal policymakers
about how best to achieve reform objectives and quell the mounting
crisis in our health care system.
291 New State Ice v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (BrandeisJ., dissenting) ("It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments with-
out risk to the rest of the country.").
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